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Abstract
We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in con-
current online auctions, where each seller must set its individual auction
parameters (such as the reserve price) in such a way as to attract buy-
ers. We show that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the case of
two sellers with asymmetric production costs. In addition, we show that,
rather than setting a reserve price, a seller can further improve its utility
by shill bidding (i.e., pretending to be a buyer in order to bid in its own
auction). But, using an evolutionary simulation, we show that this shill
bidding introduces inefficiences within the market. However, we then go
on to show that these inefficiences can be reduced when the mediating
auction institution uses appropriate auction fees that deter sellers from
submitting shill bids.
1 Introduction
Online markets are becoming increasingly prevalent and extend to a wide variety
of areas such as e-commerce, Grid computing, recommender systems, and sensor
networks. To date, much of the existing research has focused on the design and
operation of individual auctions or exchanges for allocating goods and services.
In practice, however, similar items are typically offered by multiple independent
sellers that compete for buyers and set their own terms and conditions (such as
their reserve price and the type and duration of the auction) within an insti-
tution that mediates between buyers and sellers. Examples of such institutions
include eBay, Amazon and Yahoo!, where at any point in time multiple concur-
rent auctions with different settings are selling similar objects, often resulting
in strong competition. Given this competition, a key research question is how a
seller should select their auction settings in order to best attract buyers and so
increase their expected profits. In this paper, we consider this issue in terms of
setting the seller’s reserve price (since the role of the reserve price has received
∗This is an abbreviated version. The complete paper is published as [2].
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Figure 1: The competing sellers game.
attention in both competitive and non-competitive settings). In particular, we
extend the existing analysis by considering how sellers may improve their profit
by shill bidding (i.e. bidding within their own auction as a means of setting an
implicit reserve price). Moreover, we investigate how the institution can deter
this undesirable shill bidding through the use of appropriate auction fees.
2 Model of Competing Sellers
The model of competing sellers proceeds in four stages (see figure 1). First,
the mediator (an institution such as eBay or Yahoo! that runs the auctions)
announces the auction fees to the sellers. The sellers then simultaneously post
their reserve prices in the second stage. In the third stage, the buyers simul-
taneously select an auction (or, equivalently, a seller) based on the observed
reserve prices. In the final stage, the buyers (and possibly the sellers who are
shill bidding) submit bids and the auctions are executed concurrently.
3 Analysis
A complete analysis of equilibrium behaviour and market efficiency for the com-
plete model is intractable [3]. Therefore, in this section, we analyse a simplified
version with two sellers and no auction fees (in section 4 we address the com-
plete model). We assume that there are N risk neutral buyers, each of whom
requires just one item. Each buyer has valuation v independently drawn from a
commonly known cumulative distribution F with density f and support [0, 1].
Each risk neutral seller offers one item for sale, has production costs xi, and
decides upon a reserve price ri and shill bid si. The preferences of buyers and
sellers are described by von Neumann and Morgenstern utility functions.
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3.1 Buyer Equilibrium Behaviour
The buyers’ behaviour for two sellers has been analysed in [1]. A rational buyer
with valuation v < r1 will not attend any auction. Furthermore, if r1 < v < r2,
the buyer will always go to seller 1. The interesting case occurs when v > r2.
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, there is a unique cut-off point 1 ≥ w ≥ r2
where buyers with v < w will always go to seller 1, and buyers with v ≥ w
will randomize equally between the two auctions. The cut-off point w is exactly
where a buyer’s expected utility is equal for both auctions, and is thus found
by solving:
r1F(r1, w)
N−1 + (N − 1)
∫ w
r1
yF(y,w)N−2dF (y) = r2F(w,w)
N−1
where F(y, w) = F (y) + [1 − F (w)]/2. Given the buyers’ cut-off point, we can
now calculate the sellers’ expected revenue.
3.2 Seller Equilibrium Behaviour
To calculate the equilibrium behaviour of the sellers, we derive a general ex-
pression for the sellers’ expected utility. This is calculated by considering the
probability of one of three events occurring: (i) no bidders having valuations
above the reserve price and the item does not sell, (ii) only one bidder having a
valuation above the reserve price and the item sells at the reserve price, or (iii)
two or more bidders having valuations above the reserve price and the item sells
at a price equal to the second highest valuation. Thus, the expected utility of
seller i who has a production cost of xi and sets a reserve price of ri is
Ui(ri, xi) = N(ri − xi)G(ri)(1 − G(ri))
N−1
+N(N − 1)
∫
1
r1
(xi − y)G
′(y)G(y)(1 − G(y))N−2dy (1)
where G(y) is the probability that a bidder is present in the auction and that
this bidder has a valuation greater than y.
Now, in the standard auction with no competing sellers, we have the standard
result that G(y) = 1 − F (y) and G′(y) = −f(y). However, for two competing
sellers, we must account for the fact that the number and valuation of the
bidders in the auction is determined by the bidders’ cut-off point w. Thus, for
sellers 1 and 2 (where seller 1 has the lower reserve price), G1 and G2 are given
by:
G1(y) =
{
1+F (w)
2
− F (y) y < w
1−F (y)
2
y ≥ w
G2(y) =
{
1−F (w)
2
y < w
1−F (y)
2
y ≥ w
(2)
Thus, the sellers’ expected utility depends on the reserve price of both sellers
and the equilibrium behaviour is complex. We now apply this result to three
different cases: (i) where both sellers declare public reserve prices, (ii) where
one seller declares a public reserve price and the other submits a shill bid, and
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(iii) where both sellers shill bid1.
Both Sellers Announce Public Reserve Prices. In this case, the equilib-
rium strategy of each seller is given by a Nash equilibrium at which each seller’s
reserve price is a utility maximising best response to the reserve price of the
competing seller. When x1 = x2, no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists [1].
However, when the sellers have sufficiently different production costs, we find
that a pure Nash equilibrium exists where the reserve price of both sellers is
higher than their production costs. We find this equilibrium numerically by it-
eratively discretising the space of possible reserve prices. That is, for all possible
values of r1 and r2 that satisfy the conditions x1 ≤ r1 ≤ 1 and r1 ≤ r2 ≤ 1, we
calculate w and hence the expected utility of the two sellers. We then search
these reserve price combinations to find the values of r∗
1
and r∗
2
that represents
the utility maximising best responses to one another. By iterating the process
and using a finer discretisation at each stage, we are able to calculate the Nash
equilibrium to any degree of precision. The outcomes show that the symmetric
case is very much a special case, and the majority of possible production cost
combinations yield unique pure strategy Nash equilibria.
One Seller Shill Bids. Rather than announce a public reserve price, either
seller may choose to announce a reserve price of zero to attract bidders, and
then submit a shill bid to prevent the item from selling at too low a price.
Thus, the seller who does not shill bid (seller 2 since r2 will be greater than r1)
should declare a reserve price that is a best response to the zero reserve price
announced by the bidder who does shill bid. This reserve price is simply given
by the value of r2 that maximises U2(r2, x2), given that we calculate G2(y) as
in equation 2 and take r1 = 0 in order to calculate w.
Given the best response reserve price of seller 2, and the resulting value of w,
we can also calculate the shill bid that seller 1 should submit in order to max-
imise its own expected utility. By substituting s1 for r1 in equation 1, and using
G1(y) as given in equation 2, we find the shill bid that maximises U1(s1, x1).
Both Sellers Shill Bid. Finally, when both sellers declare a zero reserve price
and shill bid, the bidders will randomise equally between either auction, since
there is no reserve price information to guide their decision. Thus we find the
equilibrium shill bids of both sellers by again substituting si for ri in equation 1
and hence finding the value of si that maximises Ui(si, xi) when w = 0.
Table 1 shows an example of the resulting four strategy combinations as a
normal form game (in this case N = 10, x1 = 0.25, and x2 = 0.5). Note that
both sellers have a dominant strategy to submit shill bids (this result holds in
general in the absence of auction fees). At this equilibrium, seller 2 achieves its
maximum possible utility. However, seller 1 receives more when neither seller
1When a seller shill bids, the declared reserve price has no additional benefit. Thus we
assume they declare no reserve price (or, equivalently, declare a zero reserve price).
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Seller 2
RP SB
Seller 1
RP 0.452 , 0.189 0.403 , 0.220
SB 0.457 , 0.188 0.423 , 0.220
Table 1: Sellers’ expected utility when either declaring a reserve price (RP) or
to shill bidding (SB).
shill bids and is thus better off with a mechanism that deters all parties from
submitting shill bids.
4 Auction Fees
We now consider auction fees and market efficiency in the competing sellers
game. We compare two types of auction fees: a closing price (CP) fee that is
a fraction, β, of the selling price (where β is the CP commission rate), and a
reserve-difference (RD) fee that is calculated as a fraction, δ, of the difference
between the selling price and the seller’s declared reserve price, (where δ is the
RD commission rate). The first type of fee is the most common in online auctions
such as eBay, Yahoo! and Amazon. The second type of fee was introduced
in previous literature, and is shown to prevent shilling for particular bidder
valuation distributions in a single multi-stage auction [4].
Auction fees add considerable complexity to the analysis of the competing
sellers game since a seller now needs to optimally set both the reserve price and
the shill bid. Therefore, we investigate auction fees using a simulation based on
evolutionary algorithms (EAs). The EA maintains a population of possible seller
strategies, where a strategy determines the shill bid and reserve price for each
auction. At each generation, M seller strategies are randomly selected from the
population and compete against one another in a number of consecutive games.
The fittest strategies survive and are transferred to the next generation, whereas
poor performing strategies are removed from the population. New strategies are
explored by slightly modifying existing individuals using a mutation operator.
This evolutionary process is repeated for a fixed number of iterations.
We now compare auction fees by considering: the shill effect, which is mea-
sured as the difference that a buyer pays on average with and without shill bids,
and a measure of the relative efficiency ηK of an allocation K, where ηK is given
by:
ηK =
∑N
i=1 vi(K) +
∑M
i=1(xi − xi(K))∑N
i=1 vi(K
∗) +
∑M
i=1(xi − xi(K
∗))
, (3)
where K∗ = argmaxk∈K[
∑
N
i=1
vi(k) −
∑
M
i=1
xi(k)] is an efficient allocation, K
is the set of all possible allocations, vi(k) is bidder i’s utility for an allocation
k ∈ K, and xi(k) is seller i’s production costs for a given allocation (in order to
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prevent a negative value we add production costs xi in both the denominator
and the numerator).
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Figure 2: Evolutionary simulation results demonstrating (a) the shill effect and
(b) the relative efficiency η,for closing-price (CP) fees (solid lines) and reserve-
difference (RD) fees (dashed lines). Results are averaged over 30 runs with
randomly set production costs and the error-bars denote 95% confidence inter-
vals.
The experimental results are shown in figure 2 for different commission rates
and number of sellers. In these experiments, each seller’s production costs are
randomly selected from a uniform distribution with support [0, 0.5] at the be-
ginning of each run. In addition, the number of bidders is set to an average of
3 per auction2.
As shown in figure 2(a), the RD fee is consistently better at reducing the shill
effect, irrespective of the number of sellers. This is because the fee provides an
incentive for lowering the shill bid as well as increasing the reserve price (since
this reduces the difference between the closing price and reserve price). The CP
fee, on the other hand, is neutral with regards to the reserve price.
By increasing the reserve price buyers can make a more informed decision
about which seller to choose. This is especially important if sellers have different
production costs. On the other hand, a higher reserve price may cause ineffi-
ciencies if this results in less items being sold. Figure 2(b), however, shows that
both fees increase the market efficiency because of the reduced shill bid, and
that the RD fees are more effective (if the RD fees are increased even further,
however, the market becomes less efficient due to the high reserve prices, and
CP fees perform better). The latter occurs because, with RD fees, the sellers’
reserve prices better reflect their production costs. This is also confirmed by
other experiments showing that the efficiency increase is similar for both fees if
sellers have no production costs (not shown due to space limitation).
To conclude, the experiments show that the RD fee is more effective in de-
terring shill bidding and increasing market efficiency. These results generalise
2We note, however, that similar results are obtained with other settings.
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beyond the two-seller case, where the increased competition among sellers lowers
the reserve prices and provides additional incentive to shill bid. This is consis-
tent with earlier results showing that RD auction fees can deter shill bidding for
isolated auctions [4]. However, our results show, for the first time, that these
fees are also effective for a setting where sellers compete. Moreover, we see that,
when using the RD fee, sellers pay much less to the mediator overall compared
to CP fees. The latter is especially important in a larger setting where multiple
mediating institutions compete to attract sellers.
5 Conclusions
Traditionally, competition among sellers has been ignored when designing auc-
tions and setting auction parameters. However, when faced with competition,
we have shown that auction parameters are important in determining the num-
ber and type of buyers that are attracted to an auction. We have also shown
that such competition provides an incentive for sellers to shill bid, but this can
be avoided by a mediator that applies appropriate auction fees. These results
are particularly relevant for online markets and multi-agent systems, where com-
petition is strong due to the ease with which a buyer (or a software agent) can
search for particular goods. Thus, in these settings, our results can be used by
sellers seeking to maximise their profit, or alternatively, by the auction institu-
tion itself, who wishes to use appropriate auction fees to deter shill bidding and
thus increase the efficiency of the market as a whole.
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